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1. INTRODUCTION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996' ("Telecommunications Act" or
"Act") assumes that competition is possible and desirable in all telecommuni-
cations markets.2 In some cases, it directs the Federal Communications Com-
mission ("FCC" or "Commission") to promulgate rules intended to move the
industry from monopoly to competition, rather than substitute regulation for
competition To the extent that such rulemakings accomplish this goal, they
should have a similar effect on consumers as ideal regulation: reducing prices
while increasing consumer spending on services.' The move from monopoly to
competition should produce additional consumer benefits that regulation rarely
delivers, such as continuous pressure to lower costs and the introduction of
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Economy, 2005, Utah State University; B.S. in Political Science and Economics, 2003, Utah
State University.
I Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2 The Act promotes "competition and reduce[s] regulation in order to secure lower
prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications' consumers and en-
courage[s] the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." Id. 110 Stat. at
56.
3 E.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 253(a), (d) (2000). Continual regulation tends to be costly since,
among other things, it requires constant oversight and is subject to politicization. See RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 403 (5th ed. 1998); see also Glenn A.
Woroch, Local Network Competition, in I HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOM-
ics 641, 655 (Cave et al. eds., 2002).
4 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 4-6, 382-84.
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
innovative new services.'
The Telecommunications Act directs the FCC to issue regulations requiring
incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs") to lease "unbundled" elements of
their local networks6 to competitors at regulated rates.7 The statute also requires
incumbents to lease the entire suite of network elements necessary to provide
local telephone service-the "unbundled network element platform" ("UNE-
P").8 In December 2004, the FCC effectively decided to stop forcing incum-
bents to lease the UJNE-P to competitors after a one-year transition period.9
Most of the largely inconclusive debate over UNE-P regulation has focused on
whether the regulated price of the UNE-P gave ILECs sufficient incentive to
5 See id. at 128, 304-05. The FCC's initial regulation of the unbundled network ele-
ment platform sought to "provide the right incentives for both incumbent and competitive
[Local Exchange Carriers] to invest rationally in the telecommunications market in the way
that best allows for innovation and sustainable competition." In re Unbundled Access to
Network Elements; Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers, Order on Remand, 20 F.C.C.R. 2533, 2 (Dec. 15, 2004) [hereinafter
Unbundled Access to Network Elements]; see POSNER, supra note 3, at 379-80 (identifying
problems warranting public regulation of natural monopolies such as that of ILECs).
6 The term "unbundled network element" derives from the combination of the Com-
mission's definitions of "unbundled access" and "network element." Section 251(c)(3) re-
quires Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers ("ILECs") to allow Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers ("CLECs") to "unbundled access" of their "network elements." 47 U.S.C. §
251(c)(3). "Unbundled Access" is defined as the "[t]he duty to provide, to any requesting
telecommunications carrier for the provision of a telecommunications service, nondiscrimi-
natory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on
rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory ...." Id. "Un-
bundled" is not defined by the Act, but is commonly known as "services, programs, soft-
ware and training sold separately from the hardware." HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELE-
COM DICTIONARY 865 (20th ed. 2004). A "network element" is the
facility or equipment used in the provision of a telecommunications service. Such term
also includes features, functions, and capabilities that are provided by means of such
facility or equipment, including subscriber numbers, databases, signaling systems, and
information sufficient for billing and collection or used in the transmission, routing, or
other provision of a telecommunications service.
47 U.S.C. § 153(29). The Act neglected to specifically identify the network elements that
ILECs were required to provide to CLECs. CHARLES H. KENNEDY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 95-96 (2d ed. 2001).
7 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3); id. § 259. Prior to the Act, ILECs wielded significant control
over competitors by denying access to the incumbents' customers and exchange facilities.
KENNEDY, supra note 6, at xxvii ("New, local competitors could achieve only a niche pres-
ence unless the incumbents completed calls from the competitors' customers to the incum-
bents' customers, and delivered calls from the incumbents' customers to the competitors'
networks.").
8 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).
9 See Unbundled Access to Network Elements, supra note 5, 63 (adopting transition
period from twelve months for mass-market local circuit switching to eighteen months for
"unbundled access to dark fiber loops and dark fiber dedicated transport").
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invest in the telephone network." This article assesses the effect of UNE-P
regulation on economic welfare independent of its effect on investment in the
network. By comparing the efficiency of UNE-P regulation to the efficiency of
an alternative, feasible policy-reducing long-distance access charges and con-
tributions to the federal Universal Service Fund ("USF")-we will demonstrate
how both policies can transfer wealth from ILECs to consumers. In reducing
access charges or USF contributions or both, a scheme may be designed to ef-
fectuate direct transfers from ILECs to consumers. Platform regulation, on the
other hand, passes a portion of the wealth transfer through competitive local
exchange carriers ("CLECs"), which may prompt ILECs to reduce their own
retail rates in order to remain competitive." The effectiveness of UNE-P regu-
lation depends on whether it stimulates efficient or inefficient competition.'2
Greater wealth transfers to consumers occur when competition is efficient,
while smaller wealth transfers occur when competition is inefficient. These
alternative policies could also have varying effects on consumer welfare 3 by
10 See, e.g., T. Randolph Beard et al., Why ADCo? Why Now? An Economic Exploration
into the Future of Industry Structure for the "Last Mile" in Local Telecommunications
Markets, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 421 (2002) (arguing that ILECs go to great lengths to deter
CLEC entry into the market); see also Mark D. Schneider et al., The USTA Decisions and
the Rise and Fall of Telephone Competition, COMM. LAW., Summer 2004, at 1, 4 ("Whether
this competition is beneficial over the long term, or is what Congress intended, remains a
matter of controversy.").
1 Unbundled Access to Network Elements, supra note 5, 5. In standard neoclassical
economic theory, competitive markets enhance consumer welfare in two ways: (1) every
unit of every resource is employed in the use that consumers value most highly ("allocative
efficiency"); and (2) firms produce at minimum average total cost ("productive efficiency").
A logical implication of these two results is that consumers pay a lower price than they
would pay under unregulated monopoly. See JAMES D. GWARTNEY & RICHARD L. STROUP,
MICROECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 173-74 (4th ed. 1987). In addition, more
sophisticated theories of competition recognize that competition is also a rivalrous process
that gives firms incentives and opportunities to discover new products, new technologies,
new production methods, and new consumer demands. See generally DYNAMIC COMPETI-
TION AND PUBLIC POLICY: TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND ANTITRUST ISSUES (Jerry Ellig
ed., 2001).
12 See generally Beard et al., supra note 10.
13 Consumer welfare is a term of art in antitrust and regulatory analysis. It is used to
distinguish the policy goal of promoting the overall welfare of consumers from other policy
goals, such as assisting producers or redistributing income from one group of consumers to
another.
Consumer welfare is greatest when society's economic resources are allocated so that
consumers are able to satisfy their wants as fully as technological constraints permit...
. Consumer welfare, as the term is used in antitrust, has no sumptuary or ethical com-
ponent, but permits consumers to define by their expression of wants in the market-
place what things they regard as wealth.




altering the price of services in markets that have a different elasticity of de-
mand.' 4 Long-distance markets have a relatively high elasticity of demand"
while demand for monthly local service is fairly inelastic. 6 It is likely that
policies reducing the price of long-distance would benefit consumers more
than policies reducing the price of local service because the market for local
service is less price-sensitive.
Regulations requiring ILECs to lease their UNE-P have generated substan-
tial "opportunity costs" for consumers." Yet, over the years, consumers re-
ceived only a fraction of the wealth that the unbundling policy transferred from
ILECs. In addition, there is another substantial opportunity cost-that of for-
gone service. Long-distance and wireless service markets have a relatively
high elasticity of demand. 8 Therefore, any regulated increase in price for the
service generates a significant decrease in the quantity of the service de-
manded. If instead, the wealth had been transferred to consumers via a policy
of reducing long-distance access charges and USF contributions, consumers
would have gained as much as $3.3 billion in 2003, and social welfare could
have increased by as much as $5 billion.9 These results show that the FCC's
14 Demand is said to be elastic when "a price increase will lead to a proportionately
greater reduction in the quantity demanded and hence to a fall in total revenue." POSNER,
supra note 3, at 296.
I5 Those markets with a high elasticity of demand are more susceptible to decreased
consumption upon the introduction of a price increase. Id.; see David L. Kaserman & John
W. Mayo, Competition in the Long-Distance Markets, in I HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS ECONOMICS, supra note 3, at 513-16 (discussing the increased demand in long-
distance markets in recent years).
16 The FCC assumed that demand for local service was inelastic when enacting provi-
sions of the Telecommunications Act. In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provi-
sions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Interconnection Between Local Exchange
Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, First Report and Order, I 1
F.C.C.R. 15,499, 696 (Aug. 1, 1996) [hereinafter First Order]; see also Alexander C. Lar-
son, Resale Issues in Telecommunications Regulation: An Economic Perspective, 2 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 57, 60 (1995-1996) ("[L]ow price elasticity of demand for
local service, means that it is extremely doubtful that resale policies can lead to significant
changes in consumer welfare.").
17 Opportunity cost is the highest-valued opportunity forgone because one chooses a
particular course of action. What we have calculated is thus, strictly speaking, a possible
opportunity cost of the UNE-P. If there is another opportunity that consumers would value
even more highly, the value of that opportunity would be the "opportunity cost." See, e.g.,
Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 545 U.S. 467 (2002).
18 See, e.g., Laura H. Phillips & Jason E. Friedrich, Wireless: Can Regulatory "Business
As Usual" Continue?, COMM. LAW., Fall 2002, at 12, 15-16 ("[Wireline and wireless pro-
viders have] starkly different elasticities of demand [and] consumers are more likely to give
up a wireless phone ... or forego getting an additional wireless phone, rather than give up
their landline telephone service.").
19 This statement is a summary of the article's principal quantitative finding. See infra
Table 7.
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decision to abandon UNE-P regulation will enhance consumer welfare, espe-
cially if combined with other initiatives to decrease the regulatory impact on
prices in long-distance markets.
II. THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY BASIS FOR RESALE AND UN-
BUNDLING
Congress sought to increase local telephone competition in the Telecommu-
nications Act through three mechanisms: "full facilities-based entry,"2 leasing
of the incumbent's UNEs, and resale of the incumbent's retail services." Full
facilities-based entry occurs when CLECs build and maintain their own facili-
ties in competition with ILECs.22 "Unbundling" occurs when CLECs lease
parts of the ILECs' network. 3 "Resale" occurs when CLECs buy the ILECs'
services at a discounted wholesale rate, then sell them to consumers at a retail
rate.24 To achieve this goal, the Telecommunications Act requires ILECs to
lease portions of their networks to CLECs at regulated rates. 5
A basic and fundamental example of a network element is the local loop--
the wire that connects a home or business to a switch located in the phone
company's central office. 6 A CLEC leasing only local loops would install its
own switches in an ILECs' central office and make its own arrangements to
transport calls between its switches. In addition to individual network ele-
ments, the FCC requires ILECs to lease the entire set of network elements nec-
essary to provide local service-the UNE-P 7 Leasing the UNE-P is equivalent
to buying the ILECs' service at a wholesale discount. Until recently, CLECs
had increasingly relied on leasing the UNE-P as a business strategy since it
was cheaper than building an entire network from scratch.28
20 First Order, supra note 16, at 16,249 (Chong, Comm'r, statement). In the First Order,
the Commission found that the Act "contemplates" the "construction of new networks" as a
requisite for entry into a marketplace, but found that "new entrants will be unable to reach
all of their customers without depending on the incumbent's facilities." Therefore, the
Commission mandated that incumbents provide network elements to competitors so that
they may enter and fully serve the marketplace. Id. 12-14.
21 Id. at 16,249 (Chong, Comm'r, statement); see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-271 (2000).
22 First Order, supra note 16, 13.
23 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).
24 First Order, supra note 16, at 16,249 (Chong, Comm'r, statement).
25 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).
26 William W. Sharkey, Representation of Technology and Production, in 1 HANDBOOK
OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS, supra note 3, at 182-83.
27 47 U.S.C. § 251 (c)(3); see also id § 259.
28 The FCC's policies concerning leasing UNEs have generated an overwhelming
amount of discussion and litigation. Many telecommunications providers reacted to the
FCC's unbundling rules by suing the FCC. E.g., Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 545 U.S.
20051
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The Telecommunications Act gave the largest local telephone companies,
the Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs"), an incentive to promptly unbundle
their networks. Section 271 of the Act permitted BOCs that sufficiently un-
bundled their networks to enter the interLATA long-distance market for the
first time. 9 The Act specifies a variety of facilities that must be unbundled but
no "impairment" analysis is required." Elements that are unbundled under §
271 also need not be offered at "Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost"
("TELRIC") 3' prices. Instead, the prices need only avoid being "unjust, unrea-
sonable, or unreasonably discriminatory."32 Once the BOCs entered into
enough interconnection, unbundling, and resale agreements, competition was
deemed to be underway.33 At this point they received approval under § 271 to
begin offering long-distance service.34 All BOCs have now obtained approval
to enter the long-distance market.3"
A. Regulating Resale of Telecommunication Services
Resale of ILEC services is provided for in § 251 (c)(4) of the Telecommuni-
cations Act.36 Subpart (A) declares that it is the duty of ILECs "to offer for re-
sale at wholesale rates any telecommunications service that the carrier provides
at retail to subscribers who are not telecommunications carriers . . . ."" Subpart
(B) states that ILECs are "not to prohibit, and not to impose unreasonable or
467 (2002); U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
29 47 U.S.C. § 271(c). InterLATA service is defined as "telecommunications between a
point located in a local access and transport area and a point located outside such area." Id. §
153(21). See generally KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 62-71 (providing a background of the
interLATA restriction).
30 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2) (listing requirements for BOCs before they may provide long-
distance services). An "impairment" analysis involves an examination into a competitor's
ability to provide service. See id. § 251(d)(2).
31 TELRIC is a "pricing standard requiring ILECs to set their rates for reciprocal com-
pensation and unbundled network elements ...." KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 42. Under this
standard, "the rate [an ILEC charges] a CLEC for any facility or network functionality can
only recover the associated forward-looking costs, assuming use of the most efficient tech-
nology." Id. In other words, an ILEC's leasing rates must be based on optimal technology
deployment; such rates may not consider less-than-optimal technology implementations. Id.
TELRIC is an acronym for "total element long run incremental cost." Id.; see discussion
infra p. 8 and note 48.
32 U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 359 F.3d at 589.
33 KENNEDY, supra note 6, at 62.
34 Id.
35 FCC, RBOC Applications to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services Under § 271,
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/in-region applications (last visited Sept. 19,
2005).
36 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4) (2000).
37 Id. § 251(c)(4)(A).
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discriminatory conditions or limitations on, the resale of such telecommunica-
tions service .... ."" Subsection (3) of Part (d) deals with wholesale pricing:
For the purposes of section 251(c)(4) of this title, a State commission shall determine
wholesale rates on the basis of retail rates charged to subscribers for the telecommunica-
tions service requested, excluding the portion thereof attributable to any marketing, billing,
collection and other costs that will be avoided by the local exchange carrier.
39
Precedent existed for the Telecommunications Act's resale provisions. A
similar policy, adopted to open the long-distance market to competition from
firms like Sprint and MCI in the 1980s, seemed to work well.4" In the local
market, however, few CLECs now seem to regard resale as the preferred busi-
ness strategy.4' AT&T, for example, found that within a year after passage of
the Act, offering local service through resale was unprofitable despite a whole-
sale discount of approximately 17%.42 Regulated wholesale discounts have
typically averaged between 15% and 25%."3
Reports from ILECs filed with the FCC indicate that there were 1.7 million
resold lines in December 1997, rising to a peak of 5.4 million in December
2000 before falling back to 1.6 million in June 2004." Competitors' numbers
are somewhat different; they reported acquiring 3.5 million resold lines in De-
cember 1999, rising to 5.1 million in June 2004. 4' Despite the disparity in
numbers, the competitors' figures suggest that resale has become less popular,
as the percentage of their lines accounted for by resale fell steadily from 42.9%
38 Id. § 251(c)(4)(B).
39 Id. § 252(d)(3).
40 Yale M. Braunstein, The Role of UNE-P in Vertically Integrated Telephone Markets:
Ensuring Healthy and Competitive Local, Long-Distance and DSL Markets (May 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, School of Information Management and Systems, University of
California, Berkeley) [hereinafter Braunstein: UNE-P Markets],
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-bigyale/UNE/UCB StudyUNEMay 2003.pdf.
41 See Christopher R. Day, The Concrete Barrier at the End of the Information, Super-
highway: Why Lack of Local Rights-Of- Way Access Is Killing Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 461, 464 (2002) ("In the last two to three years, most new
CLECs have embraced the facilities-based model due to the fact that many entrants relying
exclusively on the resale model found it difficult, and in some cases impossible, to earn a
profit by repackaging and reselling the services of incumbent carriers.")
42 ROBERT W. CRANDALL, CRITERION ECONS., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPETITIVE
LOCAL EXCHANGE CARRIERS FIVE YEARS AFTER THE PASSAGE OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ACT 32 (2001) [hereinafter CRANDALL: CLEC ASSESSMENT],
http://www.criterioneconomics.com/docs/Crandall%20CLEC.pdf.
43 Robert W. Crandall & Jerry Hausman, Competition in U.S. Telecommunication Ser-
vices: Effects of the 1996 Legislation, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT'S
NEXT? 73, 84, 97 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000).
44 See WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, FCC, LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS





in December 1999 to 16% in June 2004.46
One explanation is that wholesale discounts are not large enough to produce
a price discrepancy that would permit effective competition with the ILECs'
local rates, which are often below incremental cost because they benefit from
cross-subsidies. Another possibility is that the regulated prices of the UNE-P,
which are equivalent to wholesale discounts of more than 45%, have made
unbundling more attractive than resale from the CLECs' perspective." A final
explanation is that resale forces CLECs to offer a service identical to that of-
fered by ILECs. The most successful CLECs, however, have developed their
own networks that can offer innovative new services, or at least better service.
Therefore, resale is not a very attractive option for CLECs.48 A CLEC can
market resold services along with its own (such as long-distance service), but
resale offers no cost or quality advantages from producing services using a
different type of network.
A few empirical studies have assessed the causes and consequences of re-
sale. Employing 1991-2000 data from markets where BOCs are the ILECs,
James Eisner and Dale E. Lehman found no statistically significant relationship
between the size of wholesale discounts and the number of lines served by
CLECs via resale.49 This finding is consistent with the theory that resale dis-
counts have not been large enough to make resale profitable. Similarly, using
1998-2000 data, Robert W. Crandall found that CLECs relying on resale had
only average revenue growth per dollar of capital assets-a finding that does
not bode well considering that CLECs' "average" financial performance has
not been very good. Crandall concludes, "Just changing the nameplate on the
service is not typically a very good strategy for attracting customers."5
B. Unbundling the Network
Unbundled access to the ILECs' network is mandated in § 251 (c)(3) of the
Telecommunications Act.5 Unbundled access is "[t]he duty to provide, to any
requesting telecommunications carrier for the provision of a telecommunica-
46 Id. tbls.3, 5.
47 Robert S. Pindyck, Mandatory Unbundling and Irreversible Investment in Telecom
Networks 7 (Jan. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, Massachusetts Institute of Technology),
http://web.mit.edu/rpindyck/www/VZ.UNE.Pindyck0104.pdf.
48 See CRANDALL: CLEC ASSESSMENT, supra note 42, at 23-32.
49 James Eisner, Federal Communications Commission, & Dale E. Lehman, Fort Lewis
College, Regulatory Behavior and Competitive Entry, Paper Presented at the 14th Annual
Conference Center for Research in Regulated Industries (June 28, 2001),
http://www.aestudies.com/library/elpaper.pdf.
50 CRANDALL: CLEC ASSESSMENT, supra note 42, at 42.
51 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000).
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tions service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled
basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are
just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory."52
Congress and the FCC have reasoned that ILECs "have economies of den-
sity, connectivity and scale; traditionally, these have been viewed as creating a
natural monopoly." 3 ILECs are capable of providing service at much lower
rates because they hold the overwhelming advantage of having a network al-
ready in place. 4 In order to promote entry into local telephony markets, Con-
gress and the FCC have attempted to remove this advantage by imposing the
unbundling requirements.5
1. The Extent to Which Unbundling Is Required
The extent of the UNE requirements has generated significant controversy.
The Telecommunications Act instructs the FCC to consider whether access to
an ILEC's proprietary network elements is "necessary" and whether an ILEC's
failure to provide access to non-proprietary elements would "impair" a
CLEC's ability to provide service. 6 In practice, the definition of "impair" be-
comes determinative as to which network elements must be made available to
CLECs. Several rounds of FCC regulations implementing the Telecommunica-
tions Act declared that ILECs must make available both individual network
elements and the UNE-P.57 The FCC's First Local Competition Order, released
on August 8, 1996, identified a minimum set of network elements. 8 The report
stated that "[t]he minimum set of network elements the Commission identifies
are: local loops, local and tandem switches (including all vertical switching
features provided by such switches), interoffice transmission facilities, network
interface devices, signaling and call-related database facilities, operations sup-
port systems functions, and operator and directory assistance facilities."'5 9
On multiple occasions, federal courts have held that the FCC's list of UNEs
52 Id.
53 See First Order, supra note 16, 11.
54 Id.
55 Id. 27 ("The Commission also concludes that Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers,
'ILECs,' are required to provide access to network elements in a manner that allows re-
questing carriers to combine such elements as they choose, and that ILECs may not impose
restrictions upon the uses to which requesting carriers put such network elements.").
56 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2).
57 See, e.g., Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 18,311 (Apr. 25, 1996).




is based on unreasonable definitions of "impair."' Courts have called upon the
FCC to articulate a definition that is linked to a natural monopoly or one that
weighs the benefits of unbundling against the costs or some combination of the
two.
6 1
In December 2004, the FCC decided that lack of access to the ILECs'
switches did not impair CLECs' ability to provide service.62 The Commission
found that CLECs have deployed a significant and growing number of their
own switches to serve the mass market, and that similar deployment is possible
in markets where CLECs had not yet deployed them.63 The FCC also found
that ILECs have significantly improved the "hot cut"' procedures used to dis-
connect local telephone wires from their own switches and connect them to the
CLECs' switches.65 In addition to removing switching from the list of UNEs,
this decision effectively killed the UNE-P, since ILECs were no longer re-
quired to furnish one of the key elements of the platform. The FCC required
ILECs to continue furnishing the UNE-P for one year from the effective date
of the order-December 2005.66
2. UNE Pricing
Prices for network elements, determined by state commissions, are to be
just, reasonable, based on cost, nondiscriminatory and "may include a reason-
able profit. '67 Network element charges are based on the TELRIC pricing
method. This price is based upon local telephone companies' Total Service
Long Run Incremental Cost, "plus a reasonable share of forward-looking joint
and common costs."68 TELRIC pricing
equates the current market value of the existing network of an incumbent telecommunica-
tions provider with the cost the incumbent would incur today if it built a local network that
could provide all the services its current network provides, to meet reasonably foreseeable
60 U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S.
467 (2002); U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
61 US. Telecomm Ass'n, 359 F.3d at 563. For example, the platform requirement ap-
peared to be based on the assumption that entire local telephone networks, rather than just
certain elements, are natural monopolies.
62 See Unbundled Access to Network Elements, supra note 5, 27.
63 Id. 42-45.
64 "Hot Cut" is the "conversion from an old to a new phone system which occurs in-




67 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1) (2000).
68 First Order, supra note 16, 29.
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demand, using the least-cost, most-efficient technology currently available.
69
Thus, the TELRIC rate is not based on the ILECs' actual historical costs, but
rather on regulators' estimate of the costs that would be borne today by a hypo-
thetical firm building the most efficient network the regulator believes possi-
ble.7" State commissions determine prices using this TELRIC pricing method-
ology.7' Thus, actual prices vary from state to state, depending upon the cir-
cumstances of the providers involved.72 Proceedings to calculate TELRIC
prices generated significant disagreement.73 In Virginia, for example, Verizon
(the ILEC) proposed a price of $22 per month for local loops, while AT&T and
Worldcom argued the price should be $6.50.74
In 2003, the Commission began to reconsider the TELRIC pricing method-
ology.75 Noteably, the FCC was not looking to adopt an entirely new method-
ology per se.76 In a report released on August 21, 2003, the FCC concluded that
"it is necessary to clarify the application of two components of TELRIC that
have a major impact on UNE prices-cost of capital and depreciation."77
In its December 2004 decision on UNE-Ps, the FCC modified pricing for the
69 See In re Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local
Exchange Carriers, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 16,978, 669 (Feb. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Review of Sec-
tion 251].
70 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1) (2004) ("The total element long-run incremental cost of an
element should be measured based on the use of the most efficient telecommunications
technology currently available and the lowest cost network configuration, given the existing
location of the incumbent LEC's wire centers.").
7' See Review of Section 251, supra note 69, 675-76.
72 See In re Review of the Commission's Rules Regarding the Pricing of Unbundled
Network Elements and the Resale of Service by Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 18,945, 6 (Sept. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Review of
Commission's Rules] ("We also note that, for any given carrier, there may be significant
differences in rates from state to state, and even from proceeding to proceeding within a
state. We are concerned that such variable results may not reflect genuine cost differences
but instead may be the product of the complexity of the issues, the very general nature of
our rules, and uncertainty about how to apply those rules.").
13 Numerous cases have been filed by telecommunications providers appealing state
TELRIC rates. A small sample of cases are referred to in this article. See, e.g. ,Verizon Cal.,
Inc. v. Peevey, 413 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2005); Verizon Fla., Inc. v. Jaber, 889 So. 2d 712
(Fla. 2004); Wis. Bell v. Bie, 340 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2003).
74 Timothy J. Tardiff, Pricing Unbundled Network Elements and the FCC's TELR1C
Rule: Economic and Modeling Issues, I REV. OF NETWORK ECON. 132, 139 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.mejournal.com/articles/tardiff sept02.pdf.
75 Review of Commission's Rules, supra note 72, 4.
76 Id. 3 ("[N]ow that competition has taken root in many areas of the count[r]y, we
initiate this proceeding to consider whether our pricing methodology is working as intended
and, in particular, whether it is conducive to efficient facilities investment.").
77 Review of Section 251, supra note 69, T 675.
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UNE-P during the one-year transition period."8 ILECs must lease the UNE-P to
CLECs at a monthly rate per line equal to the higher of either (I) the rate paid
by the CLEC on June 15, 2004 plus $1.00; or (2) the rate established by the
relevant state public utility commission between June 16, 2004 and the effec-
tive date of the Order, plus $1.00.
III. PREVIOUS STUDIES OF UNE REGULATION
At first glance, the UNE-P might seem to be a simple and elegant solution to
the monopoly problem in local telephone service. To the extent that ILECs
enjoy a monopoly over the local telephone network, regulation can potentially
promote competition by forcing them to lease the local network to CLECs at
prices that would exist in a competitive market. If the underlying premise of
the Act is correct-that local telephone service is not a natural monopoly °- -
then UNE-P regulation should lead to competitive entry and eventually obviate
the need for retail price regulation. Over time, competition might even make
the unbundling requirements unnecessary once there is sufficient facilities-
based competition.
A logical extension of this argument might go even further, advocating be-
low-competitive pricing of network elements to give competition an even
greater boost. The rationale behind this argument is that such pricing would
elicit more rapid competitive entry, which is desirable because competition
will bring new services and other innovations that consumers value. Experi-
ence shows that when regulated monopolies or cartelized industries are deregu-
lated and opened to competition, substantial innovations result whose effects
could not be quantified in advance."' Perhaps these benefits are worth sacrific-
ing short-term economic efficiency. However, it is unlikely that below-
competitive prices for the UNE-P would hasten the arrival of these dynamic
benefits. Indeed, such prices would more than likely assure that CLECs would
never build their own local networks until the ILEC networks wear out, be-
cause those network elements would always be cheaper to lease from the ILEC
78 See Unbundled Access to Network Elements, supra note 5, 228.
79 Id.
80 See H.R. REP.No. 103-559(1993).
81 See, e.g., ROBERT CRANDALL & JERRY ELLIG, CTR. FOR MKT. PROCESSES, ECONOMIC
DEREGULATION AND CUSTOMER CHOICE: LESSONS FOR THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY (1997),
http://www.mercatus.org/pdf/materials/839.pdf; Robert Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does
Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 3
(2003); Jerry Ellig, Railroad Deregulation and Consumer Welfare, 21 J. REG. ECON. 143
(2002); Clifford Winston, Economic Deregulation: Day of Reckoning for Microeconomists,
31 J. ECoN. LITERATURE 1263 (1993).
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than to build. To encourage efficient competition, with all of its dynamic bene-
fits, it should be sufficient that monopolized network elements are offered at
competitive market prices.
There are three reasons that platform regulation as adopted by the FCC
could fall short of the competitive 2 ideal: regulated prices and competitive
market prices are rarely equivalent,83 ILECs cannot refuse to provide service,4
and cross-subsidies artificially lower retail telephone rates.
A. Regulated Prices May Fail to Mimic the Competitive Market Price of UNEs
Since technological change tends to lower costs over time, regulated prices
based on historical costs are unlikely to mirror competitive market prices.
Likewise, decades of monopoly likely inflated costs. 5 Under TELRIC, regula-
tors estimate hypothetical competitive prices based in part on their estimate of
82 For the sake of simplicity, this entire discussion speaks of the "competitive" price in
the same sense as most introductory economics textbooks-as a single price charged by a
firm whose behavior is constrained by the presence of competitors. By assumption, the
competitive entity must be as efficient as possible, or else competitors will displace it. Also
by assumption, competition is sufficiently strong enough that the entity cannot unilaterally
raise prices or eam profits that exceed its cost of capital. In an industry such as telecommu-
nications, which is undergoing rapid technological change, the concept of the "competitive"
price is somewhat more complicated for several reasons. First, technological improvements
mean that prices are likely to fall over time; thus, it is more accurate to speak of a competi-
tive price path rather than a single competitive price. The more rapid the pace of innovation,
the more rapidly prices fall-but the more rapidly prices fall, the higher they must be ini-
tially if firms expect to recoup their investments before competitors imitate or out-innovate
them. Second, diverse consumer wants can lead to product differentiation. In such a situa-
tion, the "competitive" price is actually a set of prices for different products and services
that are not perfect substitutes. Third, the possibility of innovation creates substantial uncer-
tainty about how much consumers are willing to pay for a service, and for how long. This
uncertainty requires a higher level of profit to elicit investment than would be required in
the absence of uncertainty. For these reasons, "the competitive price" of a telecommunica-
tions service or facility is likely to be a range of price paths which differ from the price that
would be observed in a relatively stable, regulated market. To keep the language simple, this
study will continue to use the term "competitive price" to refer to this more complicated,
dynamic collection of prices.
83 See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of For-
ward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1139 (1997). Spidak and Spulber argue that
regulated TELRIC pricing "would not cover the firm's total direct costs, nor would it com-
pensate the firm for its economic costs inclusive of opportunity costs." Id. They add that
"[clompetitve pricing does not emulate ... TELRIC pricing. To the contrary, such pricing
would invite free riding and would subsidize entrants, both conditions that competitive mar-
kets do not willingly tolerate." Id.
84 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2000).
85 See Braunstein: UNE-P Markets, supra note 40, at 1, 3.
20051
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
what prices could be.86 Given the informational advantage that ILECs possess,
it is possible that regulators could be manipulated into adopting prices that are
above competitive levels. Several studies clearly assume that the ILECs are
monopolists with plenty of room to cut prices, either because they reap large
profits or because they have inherited significantly inflated costs.87
Regulated prices could also be below the competitive level. TELRIC repre-
sents a regulator's estimate of what a so-called efficient firm's costs ought to
be.88 The methodology has been widely criticized for understating costs for a
variety of reasons. One reason is that TELRIC is based on hypothetical rather
than actual costs. In addition, TELRIC may assume unrealistically low depre-
ciation rates. Lastly, TELRIC ignores the cost of the valuable option CLECs
receive from entrants who must lease network elements at TELRIC prices.89
Below-competitive network element prices may appear to benefit consumers
in the short run, either because they lead to lower retail prices or because they
facilitate entry by CLECs who offer innovative new services. Nevertheless,
below-competitive network element prices could diminish an ILEC's incentive
to maintain its network, which could lead to shortages or service degrada-
tions.9"
86 First Order, supra note 16, 29.
87 See, e.g.,Yale M. Braunstein, UNE-P Benefits Update: SBC's California Territory
(May 2004) (unpublished manuscript, School of Information Management and Systems,
University of California, Berkeley) [hereinafter Braunstein: Cal. Study],
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-bigyale/UNE/CAUNE competition-update 2004.pdf;
Yale M. Braunstein, UNE-P Benefits in Verizon's New Jersey Territory (March 2004) (un-
published manuscript, School of Information Management and Systems, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley) [hereinafter Braunstein: N.J. Study],
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-bigyale/UNE/JCB NJ UNEstudyMar 2004.pdf; Braun-
stein: UNE-P Markets, supra note 40, at 1; RICHARD N. CLARKE ET AL., NAT'L BUREAU OF
ECON. RESEARCH, ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC GAINS FROM TELECOM COMPETITION (2004),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w 10482.
88 See generally Robert W. Crandall et al., Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC
Facilities-Based Investment?, 4 ToPics ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y (2004) [hereinafter Cran-
dall: Unbundling Policies].
89 Id. See generally Jerry Hausman, The Effect of Sunk Costs in Telecommunications
Regulation, Paper Presentation at Columbia University Conference (October 2, 1998),
http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/downloadpdf.phpid=258; Jerry Hausman & J. Gregory
Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to the Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunica-
tions Networks, 109 YALE L.J. 417 (1999); ALFRED E. KAHN, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB.
POLICY RESEARCH,WHOM THE GODS WOULD DESTROY, OR How NOT TO DEREGULATE
(2001), http://www.aei-brookings.com/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id= 112; Alfred E. Kahn
et al., The Telecommunications Act at 3 years: An Economic Evaluation of its Implementa-
tion by the FCC, II INFo. ECON. & POL'Y 319 (1999); Thomas M. Jorde et al., Innovation,
Investment, and Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2000); PINDYCK, supra note 47, at 5.
90 Below-competitive prices could also diminish the incentive to develop new services if
they are applied to those services. This is an issue separate from that of the UNE-P, which
consisted of existing telecommunications services.
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B. ILECs Have an Obligation to Provide Service
The structure of telecommunications regulation suggests another likely ef-
fect of below-competitive prices for the UNE-P. Incumbent phone companies
are not free to simply abandon the local network or allow service to deterio-
rate. Financial analysts estimate that ILEC BOCs need to reinvest 15%-20% of
their revenues in order to maintain the network without reducing service qual-
ity.9 Given the historic common carrier obligation of local telephone compa-
nies, regulators would likely respond to below-competitive UNE-P prices by
mandating that ILECs continue to maintain networks sufficient to supply retail
customers' demand for service, as well as competitors' demand for UNEs, at
the regulated rates. If the regulated rates are insufficient to elicit the invest-
ment, cross-subsidies would be required. Consequently, the inefficiencies of
below-competitive prices for the UNE-P may ultimately show up not as short-
ages or reduced investment in the local network, but as higher USF fees, access
charges, or other methods of extracting revenue from the services that subsi-
dize local service. In addition to generating supplementary funds for cross-
subsidies, elevated charges in these other markets would harm consumers by
reducing the amount of service consumed.
C. Significant Cross-Subsidies Inherent in the Structure of Regulated Retail
Telephone Rates Currently Exist
For most residential customers, the monthly charge for local phone service
fails to cover the incremental cost of providing the service.92 Businesses usu-
ally pay higher rates than residences93 and it is likely that business rates cover
" P1NDYCK, supra note 47, at 24.
92 There is virtually unanimous agreement among regulatory economists that histori-
cally, local telephone service has received cross-subsidies funded by overcharges for other
services. See Wayne Leighton, Consumers and Cross-Subsidies: An Interest Group Theory
of Telecommunications Regulation (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Mason
University) (on file with authors). The argument that long-distance service does not cross-
subsidize local service is based on the assumption that local loop costs are "common costs"
of producing long-distance and local service. However, the fact that customers might use
local phone lines for both local and long-distance calls does not mean that local loops are
common costs for the phone companies. A loop provides a customer with access to the tele-
communications network. The cost of any loop is incremental to the rest of the system, and
a loop receives a subsidy if it does not cover its incremental costs. See generally ROBERT
CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, WHO PAYS FOR UNIVERSAL SERVICE? (2000); Steve G.
Parsons, Cross-Subsidization in Telecommunications, 13 J. REG. EcON. 157 (1998).





the incremental cost of service at a minimum. To encourage competition, the
price of the UNE-P must be sufficiently low that CLECs can profitably meet or
beat the ILECs' regulated prices.94 This is more likely for business customers
than for residential customers. Given the size of cross-subsidies to basic resi-
dential phone service, it is possible that the competitive market prices of the
UNE-P would be insufficiently low to make entry profitable. Regulators then
face the dilemma of either having competition appear to be a failure, or man-
dating below-competitive prices for the UNE-P so that CLECs can match the
ILECs' below-cost retail prices.
1. Are UNE Prices Too High?
The purpose of the UNE-P is to encourage local telephone service competi-
tion by enabling CLECs to gain a presence in the market.95 If the price of the
platform is above the level that would exist in a competitive market, CLECs
would have much less incentive to use IJNEs to enter the market. Total in-
vestment in the telecommunications network would be lower than it otherwise
would be for two reasons: (1) retail prices would be higher, reducing output;
and (2) less competitive entry would likely mean fewer additional facilities
would be constructed.
One recent paper raises the possibility that many state utility commissions
set LINE prices above TELRIC levels.96 This study estimates that the accurate
TELRIC price for the UNE-P is $15.10 per month, which the authors claim is
27.9% below actual average 2002 TELRIC rates for the platform.97 If the net-
work element platform prices were set at these "true" TELRIC rates, average
local revenues per line would be 10.6% below the actual 2002 level. True
TELRIC pricing, they contend, would increase the present value of telecom-
munications companies' expenditures on investment and labor by $71 billion
over the next five years and by $155 billion over the next twenty years.98
The authors' estimate of a "true" TELRIC rate may be accurate. However,
the results of the model rely on the assumption that the "true" TELRIC rate of
$15.10 per month is 27.9% lower than actual rates.99 A survey conducted by
the National Regulatory Research Institute shows that the UNE-P rate aver-
aged $16-$17 per month in August 2004, down 16%-20% from January
94 First Order, supra note 16, 18-19.
95 Id. 12.
96 See CLARKE ET AL., supra note 87, at 5.
97 The authors arrived at the S15.10 figure by reducing 1998 FCC-calculated TELRIC
prices by 5% per year to reflect assumed price and cost reductions. Id. at 32.
98 Id. at 5.
99 Id. at 32.
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2002.'" The August 2004 figures were much closer to $15.10, which implies
that most of the benefits predicted by this study have already occurred as a re-
sult of price reductions that have taken effect since 2002. ' The authors' pre-
dictions imply that the significant reduction in UNE-P rates between 2002 and
2004 should have been accompanied by both a reduction in retail telephone
rates and a telecommunications investment boom. 2 Quite the opposite of the
latter actually occurred.
2. Are UNE Prices Too Low?
Several reports calculate whether regulated prices of network elements (and,
by implication, the UNE-P) are below the level that would exist in a competi-
tive market. Studies by David M. Mandy calculate that the FCC's forward-
looking Hybrid Cost Proxy Model ("HCPM")' 3 understates the present-value
cost of an end-office switch by about 24%."° End-office switching is a signifi-
cant cost comprising approximately 10% of all costs in the HCPM °5 Aggre-
gated nationally over the life of the switch, this means that ILECs received
approximately $4.5 billion (in 1999) less for access to their switches under
TELRIC than they would receive in a competitive market."6
An FCC working paper co-authored by William Sharkey and Mandy esti-
mates the "correction factor" necessary to make TELRIC prices yield the target
100 Billy Jack Gregg, A Survey of Unbundled Network Element Prices in the United
States, (Jan. 1999), http://www.cad.state.wv.us/Janlntro2004.htm.
101 Another potential problem is that the calculations assume that the price elasticity of
demand for telephone service equals negative one. See CLARKE ET AL., supra note 87, at 15.
Most empirical studies find the elasticity for demand for local phone service is extremely
low-which means that a reduction in price will lead to a negligible increase in consump-
tion, and hence a much smaller increase in investment to supply the larger quantity de-
manded.
102 See id. at I.
103 The Hybrid Cost Proxy Model is a "forward-looking economic cost methodology
[used] to calculate support levels for non-rural carriers. Under this methodology, a forward-
looking computer based cost mechanism would be used to estimate non-rural carriers' for-
ward-looking economic cost of providing services in high cost areas." William W. Sharkey,
Representation of Technology and Production, in I HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ECONOMICS, supra note 3, at 206. See generally id. at 210-15 (discussing the Hybrid Cost
Proxy Model in detail).
104 State utility commissions, not the FCC, set TELRIC prices and utility commissions
may select cost models other than the FCC's Hybrid Cost Proxy Model. However, this
model is the tool the FCC uses to estimate forward-looking costs for the purpose of distrib-
uting USF subsidies.
105 See David M. Mandy, TELRIC Pricing With Vintage Capital, 22 J. REG. ECON., 215,
218 (2002).
106 David M. Mandy, Pricing Network Elements When Costs Are Changing, 26 TELE-
COMM. POL'Y 53, 55, 64 (2002); Mandy, supra note 105, at 218.
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rate of return that regulators want to allow ILECs earn. 7 When investment
costs fall by 11% annually-the percentage assumed for switching assets in the
FCC's cost model-switching prices should be 50% higher than that model
dictates. 8 In other words, TELRIC may underestimate the correct switching
prices by about 33%. The principal reason for the difference is that TELRIC
assumes that the ILEC charges a uniform price over the life of the asset. A firm
in a competitive market where investment costs drop over time would charge
higher prices than TELRIC assumes in the early years. If TELRIC prices are
recalculated before the end of the asset's useful life, TELRIC under-
compensates the ILEC by depriving it of the higher prices in the early years
but forcing the ILEC to lower prices in later years."'
Jerry Hausman argues that TELRIC prices inadequately compensate ILECs
for the risks associated with sunken costs and uncertainty."' Adjusting for
these factors, he estimates that the price for transport links should be 2.35
times the TELRIC rate. Further, the price for ports should be 1.23 times the
TELRIC rate."' These estimates suggest that TELRIC prices are 67% and 19%
below competitive levels, respectively."
2
Crandall, Allan Ingraham, and Hal Singer examined the effect of regulated
rates for unbundled loops-the wires that connect individual customers with
telephone company switching facilities. Loops are arguably the network ele-
ment most likely to be a natural monopoly. They found that in 2000 and 2001,
CLECs' ratio of facilities-based loops-to-loops leased from ILECs was lower
in states where unbundled loop rates were lower relative to the cost of building
new loops."3 The rate of growth of CLECs' facilities-based loops was also less
when unbundled loop rates were lower relative to the cost of building new
loops."' Ultimately, lower regulated loop prices prompt CLECs to lease loops
107 DAVID M. MANDY & WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC PLANNING, FCC,
DYNAMIC PRICING AND INVESTMENT FROM STATIC PROXY MODELS 2 (2003),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-238934A2.pdf.
108 Id. at 43.
109 Id. at 8-9; see also Review of Commission's Rules, supra note 72, T 22. To be fair,
the FCC has stated that it is "appropriate for state commissions to employ accelerated de-
preciation in order to reflect accurately the anticipated decline in the value of assets in a
competitive market." Id. It is unknown whether states have done so.
110 See generally Hausman, supra note 89.
11 Id. at 15. Hausman discusses these figures in regards to TSLRIC (total service long
run incremental cost) which allows a new entrant to buy the use of the unbundled element
on a month-by-month basis. Id. The author notes that the "FCC chose a variant of TSLRIC,
called TELRIC for total element LRIC. However, the essential economic problem of
TSLRIC also exists in TELRIC." Id. at 6 n. 16.
112 See id. at 15.
113 Crandall: Unbundling Policies, supra note 88, at 12.
114 Id. at 15-17.
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rather than build their own."
All of these studies imply that TELRIC prices are below those that would
exist in a competitive market. However, none of them take the next step and
estimate the impact on consumers of this below-competitive price ceiling. So
far, no empirical research published in a scholarly journal proves that network
element regulation has reduced ILECs' investments in maintaining the local
telephone network." 6 Indeed, J. Gregory Sidak notes that there appears to be
significant excess capacity in the telecommunications industry, which suggests
over-investment rather than under-investment." 7 A definitive answer needs to
focus on investments in the local network rather than all telecommunications
facilities, and disentangle the effects of network element prices from the ef-
fects of the general telecommunications industry boom of the 1990s. In the
absence of such evidence, any negative effects of the UNE-P would have to
take the form of cross-subsidies from other services that are higher than they
otherwise would be.
3. Are Regulated UNE Prices Low Enough to Offset Cross-Subsidies?
Regulated UNE prices may be below competitive levels, but so are the
ILECs' retail prices for residential service in many locations, especially in ru-
ral areas." 8 It is possible that UNE prices, even if below competitive levels, are
nevertheless insufficiently low to prompt competitive entry in the face of
cross-subsidized local rates:
Local phone companies are being forced simultaneously to provide service at averaged
prices to expensive rural customers and to sell wholesale access at cost to their competitors,
who can then resell phone service to urban and business customers. This in turn, under-
mines the local phone companies' ability to comply with universal service obligations."
9
By most measures, competitive entry has grown steadily since the passage
of the Telecommunications Act. 2° Despite a huge drop in CLECs' stock mar-
'5 Id. at20.
116 Several studies find that recently abandoned policies applying UNE regulation to new
types of investments such as broadband, fiber to the home, and advanced services generally
tend to reduce those new investments by incumbents. See JEFFREY A. EISENACH & THOMAS
M. LENARD, PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., TELECOM DEREGULATION AND THE ECONOMY:
THE IMPACT OF "UJNE-P" ON JOBS, INVESTMENT AND GROWTH 11-13 (2003),
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop 0.3unepimpact.pdf.
117 J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the
Collapse ofAmerican Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207, 216
(2003).
118 CRANDALL & WAVERMAN, supra note 92, at 105-28.
119 Stuart Buck, TELRIC vs. Universal Service: A Takings Violation?, 56 FED. COMM.
L.J. 1, 3 (2003).
120 See COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, FCC, LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF
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ket values since 1999 and many significant bankruptcies, their revenues, access
lines, voice switches, and market shares have all grown steadily for wholly or
partially facilities-based CLECs. 2' At least during the first three years after the
enactment of the Telecommunications Act, CLECs (including those leasing
some network elements) entered where the economies of scale suited them
best: high density or urban markets.'22 It is cheaper to provide wireline service
to urban consumers than to rural consumers. Historically, rural consumers'
local telephone service has been subsidized by urban consumers because prices
are averaged, regardless of the marginal cost per consumer.'23
4. Studies Report Mixed Results on the Effect of UNE-P Prices on Competition
and Prices
Employing 1997-2000 data from markets where BOCs are the ILECs, Eis-
ner and Lehman found that lower UNE prices do not increase the number of
lines served by competitors using UNEs, but they decrease facilities-based en-
try. 24 Section 271 approval, which indicates that regulators believe the BOC
ILEC has unbundled sufficiently to open the local market to competition, is
associated with a 260,000-336,000 increase in lines served by CLECs using
UJNEs.' 2' Lower residential rates are often associated with less facilities-based
competitive entry, but lower business rates are not. This is to be expected given
that business rates are usually higher than residential rates.
A study using 1998 data found that there is less facilities-based competition
for residential customers when the ratio of business to residential rates is
higher.126 This result suggests that cross-subsidies from business to residential
JUNE 30, 2000 (2000), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-
State Link/lAD/lcom 1200.pdf.
121 Ass'N FOR LOCAL TELECOMMS. SERVS., THE STATE OF LOCAL COMPETITION 2004
(2004), http://www.alts.org/Filings/2004%2OAnnual%2OReport.ppt.
122 See generally James Zolnierek et al., An Empirical Examination of Entry Patterns in
Local Telephone Markets, 19 J. REG. ECON. 143 (2001).
1
23
WIRELNE COMPETITION BUREAU, FCC, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE (2003),
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common Carrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/trendU3.pdf.
124 Eisner & Lehman, supra note 49.
125 Since the incumbents are BOCs and § 271 proceedings tended to reduce UNE rates,
this variable may be considering the effects of UNE pricing. Alternatively, it may reflect the
fact that long-distance companies responded to Bell entry into long-distance by increasing
their use of UNEs so that they could offer packages of local and long-distance service to
match the Bells' offerings.
126 See Augustin J. Ros & Karl McDermott, Are Residential Local Exchange Prices Too
Low? Drivers to Competition in the Local Exchange Market and the Impact of lnefficient
Prices, in EXPANDING COMPETITION IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 149 (Michael A. Crew ed.,
2000).
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customers discourage competition for residential customers. Using a different
measure of business rates, Eisner and Lehman found that the ratio of business
to residential rates has no effect on entry. This outcome likely occurred be-
cause business rates in all states exceed residential rates to the point that the
ratio does not affect the amount of entry.'27
Yale M. Braunstein noted that in California, the Public Utilities Commission
reduced the UNE-P rate by 39% in May 2002 to $13.97 per month. 12' Never-
theless, the price charged by AT&T (a major competitor using the UNE-P) for
a basic local phone line at the end of 2003 was actually higher than the rate
charged by incumbent SBC Communications. This fact suggests that there is
little profit potential for CLECs in only reselling basic phone service. In a
similar study, Braunstein's data demonstrated that AT&T's price for a basic
local phone line in New Jersey was higher than that of the ILEC, Verizon
Communications.' 29 Thus, it appears from these figures that even substantial
reductions in the UNE-P price were insufficient to make UNE-P-based compe-
tition for basic telephone service profitable.
These results also illustrate that competition is much more feasible for pack-
ages that include long-distance service and vertical features, such as call wait-
ing or voicemail. This is consistent with 2001-02 surveys of rates for packages
of local, long-distance, and vertical services in Illinois and Michigan. Studies
conducted by lobbying coalitions in both states found that CLECs offer a
"typical" package for $11.87 per month less than the ILEC in Illinois and
$8.02 per month less than the ILEC in Michigan. 3
Nationally, reductions in UNE-P rates since 2002 appear to have increased
utilization of the UNE-P. Between January 2002 and July 2003, the average
price of the UNE-P fell by 17%, from $18.95 to $15.67 per month.'31 The
number of UNE-P lines rose from 5.8 million at the end of 2001 to 13 million
by the middle of 2003.132 By December 2003, UNE-P lines accounted for 51%
of all CLEC lines, up from 29% at the end of 2001."'
127 Eisner & Lehman, supra note 49, at 10.
128 Braunstein: Cal. Study, supra note 87.
129 See Braunstein: N.J. Study, supra note 87. The "A la carte" tab of the New Jersey
spreadsheet, Column B, lists the AT&T price of local service as $8.95, and Column G lists
the Verizon price as $8.84. Id.
130 See generally ILL. COAL. FOR COMPETITIVE TELECOMMS., CONSUMER SAVINGS FROM
LOCAL TELEPHONE SERVICE COMPETITION IN ILLINOIS (2003) (on file with authors) [hereinaf-
ter ICCT]; MICH. ALLIANCE FOR COMPETITIVE TELECOMMS., CONSUMER SAVINGS FROM
LOCAL PHONE COMPETITION IN MICHIGAN (2003) [hereinafter MACTI,
http://www.miact.org/pdf/Mich ConsumerSavings.pdf.
131 Gregg, supra note 100.
132 Id.
133 See WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, FCC, LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS
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Even if the FCC had retained the UNE-P, it is unclear whether UNE-P based
CLECs would have survived in the long term. Analyzing data from 1998-
2000, Crandall found that CLECs whose revenues per dollar of assets grew the
fastest were those that built their own networks, not those that relied on
UNEs. 3 4 There was no difference in performance between CLECs targeting
business or residential customers.'35 CLECs using a mixed strategy of leasing
some network elements and building portions of their own network performed
better than those that relied wholly on UNEs but worse than those using their
own network exclusively.'36 This result may occur because the typical CLEC
seeks to offer local telephone service in combination with other services, such
as long-distance, Internet, high-speed data connection, or video. A CLEC
building its own network and using nascent technology can offer a wider array
of services than one relying heavily on the ILEC's older network, which was
originally designed to carry voice traffic only. These results do not mean that a
CLEC that failed to invest in its own network could not be successful. They
simply mean that those firms that did not invest in their own facilities were less
likely to succeed.
The existing research on competition suggests that UNE regulation encour-
aged entrants to use lNEs, but discouraged them from building their own fa-
cilities.'37 Prices for leasing the liNE-P were insufficiently low to make stand-
alone sales of basic telephone service a profitable business. CLECs who of-
fered packages that included other features, such as vertical services and long-
distance, appeared to offer lower package prices than the ILECs in a number of
large states.
5. So Cui Bono, Sonny?
No studies published in scholarly journals have quantified the effect of liNE
regulation on retail prices or consumer welfare. Several studies published by
various think tanks or coalitions, and several working papers on websites, es-
timate consumer savings or consumer benefits.'38
These studies likely overstate the savings, for several reasons. First, they at-
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2003, tbls.3, 5 (June 2004),
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-State Link/IAD/1com0604.pdf
[hereinafter LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2003].
134 CRANDALL: CLEC ASSESSMENT, supra note 42, at 73.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See generally Zolnierek et al., supra note 122; LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION:
STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31,2003, supra note 133.
138 See generally ICCT, supra note 130; MACT, supra note 130.
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tribute all of the price savings to the UNE-P. This ignores the effects of actual
or potential competition from facilities-based telephone companies-CLECs
who lease only some network elements, cable, and wireless.'39 An accurate
measure of the effects of the UNE-P would compare actual prices to those that
would exist in the absence of the UNE-P. Second, the studies may artificially
inflate the price differences due to the way they handle the long-distance com-
ponent of the service package. 4 A more sophisticated approach can be found
in studies estimating the effect of UNE competition on residential prices in
California and New Jersey. Braunstein compares the ILECs' and AT&T's
2003 price packages that include local, vertical, and long-distance services
with the ILECs' 2002 prices.' 4' Braunstein estimates that California residential
customers in SBC Communications' territory save between $345 and $625
million annually due to the UNE-P. "2 He obtained similar results in a study of
New Jersey, estimating that competition via the UNE-P saved residential cus-
tomers between $133 and $217 million annually.'43
Unlike the Illinois and Michigan studies, Braunstein examines comparable
service packages afforded by SBC Communications and AT&T. Nevertheless,
his calculations likely overstate the saving because he often uses the prior
year's SBC Communications' A la carte prices as a proxy for the prices that
would exist in the absence of UNE regulation.'44 As a result, some of the inher-
ent efficiencies of packaging were counted as benefits from UNE regulation
and any underlying increases in productivity or efficiency were attributed to
UNE regulation as well. Like the Illinois and Michigan studies, Braunstein
attributes all of the price savings to competition using the UNE-P rather than
other forms of competition. In addition, he ignores other factors that may ex-
plain reductions in long-distance prices over time, such as long-term price
trends driven by technological change, excess capacity, and entry of the BOCs
into long-distance service. This is an especially significant factor since many
139 Wireless services may be an especially important source of pricing pressure on long-
distance rates, since wireless companies offer national calling plans for a modest additional
fixed charge.
140 SBC did not offer long-distance service during the time when the data were gathered,
but the competitors offered packages of local service, vertical features, and long-distance. In
an effort to make prices comparable, the studies increased SBC's price by an amount equal
to the average number of toll minutes in the sample multiplied by the average per-minute
price of toll service. This adjustment means that SBC's hypothetical package price incorpo-
rates long-distance at its stand-alone price, rather than a lower price that would reflect the
efficiencies of packaging. The competitor's package price, on the other hand, includes these
efficiencies. Braunstein: Cal. Study, supra note 87.
"41 Braunstein: Cal. Study, supra note 87; Braunstein: N.J. Study, supra note 87.
142 Braunstein: Cal. Study, supra note 87.
143 Id.
144 Id.; Braunstein: N.J. Study, supra note 87.
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of the California and New Jersey price savings are driven by reductions in
long-distance prices.'45 To partially adjust for other factors affecting long-
distance prices, he offers a "conservative" estimate that apportions only part of
the package savings to local competition, as well as an "aggressive" estimate
that assumes long-distance prices were already at competitive levels in 2002
and hence had no further room to fall.' 46
A Phoenix Policy Center study employing 1999 data estimated nationally
that "all distance" packages with no additional usage charges save consumers
about $6.7 billion annually compared to A la carte prices. 4 7 Consumer welfare
increases by an additional $3.3 billion due to increased use of telecommunica-
tions services at the lower price.' The study's rhetoric implies that these sav-
ings are due to competition fostered by unbundling but it does not test alterna-
tive explanations, such as competition from facilities-based carriers, techno-
logical change, or excess long-distance capacity. Nevertheless, the study
makes the novel point that a long-distance carrier can achieve "do-it-yourself'
reductions in access charges by becoming a CLEC.'49 Of course ILECs that are
permitted to offer packages of local and long-distance services can achieve
these same kinds of savings, but they were not permitted to offer long-distance
service in 1999. Although presented as an estimate of the benefits of unbun-
dling, the study's findings actually identify a significant benefit of packaging:
it reduces inefficient cross-subsidies by effectively circumventing access
charges."'
IV. THE EFFECTS OF UNE-P REGULATION ON CONSUMER WELFARE
Information contained in the Illinois, Michigan, California, and New Jersey
studies can serve as a starting point for assessing the effects of UNE regulation
on consumer welfare. Each of the studies estimates consumer savings by iden-
tifying residential price reductions offered by UNE-P-based CLECs and
ILECs. None posits any increase in telephone subscriptions as a result of the
price reductions-an assumption consistent with well-known research findings
that subscription levels have very little response to price changes. 5' CLECs
145 Braunstein: Cal. Study, supra note 87; Braunstein: N.J. Study, supra note 87.
146 Braunstein: Cal. Study, supra note 87; Braunstein: N.J. Study, supra note 87.
147 PHOENIX POLICY CTR., THE $10 BILLION BENEFIT OF UNBUNDLING: CONSUMER SUR-





'5' See CRANDALL & WAVERMAN supra note 92, at 91; Christopher Garbacz & Herbert
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appear to sell basic phone service at a price similar to ILECs. Likewise, ILECs
do not appear to have lowered basic phone rates in response to competition.
Given this reality, consumers likely perceive the drop in package prices as a
reduction in the price of non-basic services such as extended area calling, toll
calling, and vertical features. Therefore, one might expect the price reductions
to cause an increase in use of these services.
A rough estimate of the additional value this creates for consumers can be
calculated by assuming that consumers perceive the package price reductions
as a drop in the price of long-distance service. Table I shows the results of this
calculation, using data in the four studies and assuming that the elasticity of
demand for long-distance service equals -0.7 (a common finding in the empiri-
cal literature on long-distance pricing)." 2 The "per line" figure is the consumer
benefit divided by the total number of residential lines in each state, as re-
ported in or estimated from data in each study.
G. Thompson, Jr., Universal Telecommunication Services: A World Perspective, INFO.
ECON. & POL'Y 495, 497, 506 (2005); Christopher Garbacz & Herbert G. Thompson, Esti-
mating Telephone Demand with State Decennial Census Data from 1970-1990: Update with
2000 Data, 24 J. REG. ECON. 373, 376 (2003); Christopher Garbacz & Herbert G. Thomp-
son, Estimating Demand with State Decennial Census Data from 1970-1990, 21 J. REG.
ECON. 317, 326 (2002).
152 Different empirical studies, using data from the past several decades, consistently find
price elasticities between -0.51 and -0.72. See Jerry Hausman & Howard Shelanski, Eco-
nomic Welfare and Telecommunications Regulation: The E-Rate Policy for Universal-
Service Subsidies, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 19, 36-37 (1999); Crandall and Waverman find that
the elasticity of demand for long-distance service is between -0.7 and -0.75. CRANDALL &
WAVERMAN, supra note 92, at 186 n. 13; In earlier work, Crandall assumed a demand elas-
ticity of -0.7, based on a number of prior studies. See generally ROBERT W. CRANDALL,
AFTER THE BREAKUP 138 (1991). The calculations also assume a linear demand curve. Thus,
the formula for the change in consumer welfare is simply 5ApAq. The resulting figures are




Table 1: Unadjusted Effect of UNE-P on Consumer Welfare53
Illinois, SBC, 2002 $209,000,000 1 $46,923,360 $13.43 $255,923,360 $73.27
Michigan, SBC, 2002 $88,600,000 $12,533,309 $4.50 $101,133,309 $36.31
California, SBC, 2003 $345,213,818 $17,522,856 $1.53 $362,736,674 $31.68
("conservative")
California, SBC, 2003 $624,824,721 $57,404,370 $5.01 $682,229,091 $59.59
("aggressive")
New Jersey, Verizon, 2003
("conservative") $133,161,198 $3,389,717 $0.73 $136,550,915 $29.42
New Jersey, Verizon, 2003
("aggressive") $217,282,413 $9,025,208 $1.94 $226,307,621 $48.75
For reasons outlined above, all of these studies likely overestimate the retail
price reductions caused by the UNE-P. One major factor influencing package
prices is the fact that packaging local with long-distance service allows a tele-
communications provider to avoid paying access charges. As Table 2 shows,
adjusting the price savings to remove the effect of a one cent per-minute reduc-
tion in access charges substantially reduces the price savings figures.154 The
adjusted figures may still overstate the effects of UNE-P competition, but one
large source of inaccuracy has been removed.
153 The calculations shown in Tables 1-5 are based on data in published studies dis-
cussed throughout this article. See generally ICCT, supra note 130; MACT, supra note 130;
Braunstein: Cal. Study, supra note 87; Braunstein: N.J. Study, supra note 87. See also In re
Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers,
Ex Parte Communication from Joan Marsh on Behalf of AT&T, CC Docket Nos. 01-338,
96-98, and 98-147, UNE-P vs. 271 LD Entry 5 (Sept. 25, 2002) [hereinafter AT&TEx Parte
Communication] (accessible via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
154 FCC estimates suggest that access charges average between 1 cent and 1.44 cents per
conversation minute, depending on the data and assumptions employed in the estimate.
States usually impose intrastate long-distance access charges that are substantially higher.
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Table 2: Effect ofAdjusting Savings for One Cent Per-Minute Reduction in
Access Charges to Reflect Efficiencies of Packaging
Illinois, SBC, 2002 $11.88 $11.05 $4.20
Michigan, SBC, 2002 $8.03 $7.27 $1.22 $0.46
California, SBC, 2003 $4.46 $2.92 $2.26 $0.72
("conservative")
California, SBC, 2003 $9.31 $7.77 $3.93 $2.39
("aggressive")
New Jersey, Verizon, 2003 $3.55 $0.97 $2.21 0
("conservative")
New Jersey, Verizon, 2003 $7.18 $4.60 $3.39 $0.81
("aggressive")
Adjustments reflect a one cent per-minute access charge reduction multi-
plied by eighty-three average toll minutes in Illinois, seventy-six average toll
minutes in Michigan, 154 weighted average toll minutes in California, and 258
weighted average toll minutes in New Jersey.
Table 3 illustrates revised savings, consumer surplus, and consumer welfare
figures using the adjusted price savings in Table 2. The revision reduces the
effects on consumer welfare moderately for Illinois and Michigan, and sub-
stantially for California and New Jersey, as Figure 1 demonstrates.
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Table 3: Adjusted Effect of UNE-P on Consumer Welfare
Illinois, SBC, 2002 $174,213,060 1 $32,603,027 $9.33 $206,816,086 $59.21
Michigan, SBC, 2002 $63,206,008 $6,378,448 $2.29 $69,584,457 $24.98
California, SBC, 2003 $133,627,798 $2,625,561 $0.23 $136,253,359 $11.90
("conservative")
California, SBC, 2003 $413,238,700 $25,109,064 $2.19 $438,347,764 $38.29
("aggressive")
New Jersey, Verizon, 2003 $7,282,065 $10,137 $0.002 $7,292,203 $1.57
("conservative")
New Jersey, Verizon, 2003("aggerseiv) 2 $73,571,233 $1,034,723 $0.22 $74,605,956 $16.07("aggressive")












Illinois, SBC 2002 Michigan, SBC, 2002 California, SBC, California, SBC, New Jersey, Verzon, New Jersey, Verizon,
2003 2003 ("aggressive") 2003 2003 ("aggressive")
("conservative") ("consevaive")
SEUnadjusted eAdjusted
To the extent that these findings actually represent the results of competition
using the UNE-P, they suggest that such competition has led to a noticeable
increase in consumer welfare compared to the previous status quo. However,
neither the four state studies nor the figures in Tables 1-3 assess the opportu-
nity cost of this policy. The opportunity cost of the UNE-P is equal to the
benefits consumers would have received under alternative policies that transfer
wealth directly to consumers, such as reductions in access charges or USF as-
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sessments. The potential for opportunity costs exists regardless of the level of
regulated UNE rates. For consumers, the opportunity cost consists of two parts:
a wealth transfer and an effect on consumer surplus.
A. Wealth Transfer
As long as UNE rates are below the monopoly level, they transfer wealth
from ILECs to CLECs and consumers. Retail price reductions by ILECs in
response to the competition, of course, flow directly to consumers. The key
question, therefore, is the extent to which the wealth transferred from ILECs to
UNE-P-based CLECs flows through to consumers.
If the CLECs are economically efficient and the market is competitive, any
wealth transferred to them should ultimately pass through to consumers. If the
CLECs are not efficient or the market is not sufficiently competitive, then not
all of the wealth transfer will flow through to consumers.'55
Table 4 estimates the efficiency of the wealth transfer to consumers in the
four states using Table 2's adjusted figures for savings to CLECs' customers.
For each telephone line served by a CLEC, the wealth transfer to the CLEC is
equal to the ILECs' revenues per access line, reduced by the price of the UNE-
P and the estimated retail costs that the ILEC avoids when it loses a line to a
UNE-P-based CLEC.'56 Table 4's total wealth transfer figure is simply the
ILECs' lost revenues per line multiplied by the number of residential lines
served by UNE-P based CLECs. These figures reveal that in most cases, a sub-
stantial portion of the wealth transfer to CLECs fails to reach consumers. Fig-
ure 2 graphically illustrates this gap. The principal exception is the near-total
pass through that occurs under the California "aggressive" scenario, which
assumes that all of the savings on packages can be attributed to competition
from UNE-P based competitors.
155 See First Order, supra note 16, 4.
156 For Illinois and Michigan, local revenues per access line are equal to the incumbent's
average price for a local package reported. See ICCT, supra note 130; MACT, supra note
130. Since the packages in Braunstein's studies of California and New Jersey include long-
distance service, local revenues per line were taken from elsewhere. See AT&T Ex Parte
Communication, supra note 153. Estimates of unbundled network element prices and
avoided costs are derived from this document as well. Id. These estimates of unbundled
network element prices are consistent with widely-reported survey results. Id.; see also
Gregg, supra note 100. The principal difference between the two studies is that the former
includes transport and amortization of non-recurring costs, while the latter does not. Thus,




Table 4: Efficiency of Wealth Transfer UNE-P Regulation
Illinois, SBC, 2002 $15.03 $64,522,708 $47,436,854 $17,085,853 74
Michigan, SBC, 2002 $13.34 $93,695,624 $51,062,008 $42,633,616 54
California, SBC, 2003("calonrnti ) $7.83 $123,516,339 $46,062,288 $77,454,052 37
("conservative")
California, SBC, 2003 $7.83 $123,516,339 $122,569,854 $946,485 99
("aggressive")
New Jersey, Verizon, $9.07 $68,091,066 $7,282,065 $60,809,000 11
2003 ("conservative")
New Jersey, Verizon, $907 $68,091,066 $34,533,506 $33,557,559 51
2003 ("aggressive")










Illinois, SBC, 2002 Michigan, SBC, 2002 California, SBC, 2003 California, SBC, 2003 New Jersey, Verion, New Jersey, Verio,
("conservative") ("aggressive") 2003 ("conservative") 2003 ("aggressive")
*ETransfer to competitors MSavings to consumers
That wealth transfers were inefficient does not mean that UNE-P-based
CLECs pocketed the rest of the wealth transfer as profit. Thomas W. Hazlett
offered a simple explanation of why many competitive entrants eventually
failed to benefit from the wealth transfers created by UNE-P regulation-open
I
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entry forced the competitors to compete away any excess.'57 The money ex-
pended by CLECs to capture the wealth transfer was used for many pur-
poses. 58 To the extent that CLECs offered lower prices or new services that
consumers could not obtain from the ILECs, some of the wealth transfer actu-
ally flowed through to consumers. To the extent that CLECs spent money to
develop services or sales efforts that consumers did not value, the money was
simply wasted. Similarly, much of the CLECs' and ILECs' expenditures on
legal services, economic studies, and engineering models used to contest the
wealth transfers must also be classified as a cost of regulation that did not
benefit consumers. The fact that the stock market values CLECs' assets at pen-
nies on the dollar suggests that CLECs have captured little of the transfer as
profit. 159
B. Consumer Surplus
The consumer surplus component of the opportunity cost arises because al-
ternative ways of transferring wealth to consumers may have effects on con-
sumer surplus that are superior to those effectuated through UNE regulation.
To the extent that UNE-P rates are below the competitive level, local telephone
service requires larger cross-subsidies if ILECs are to maintain investment in
the network. 6 ' These cross-subsidies require higher prices on other services, in
the form of access charges, USF assessments, or other measures that distort the
market. 6' The price increases will reduce consumption of the affected services,
and the resulting reduction in consumer surplus is indeed an opportunity cost
of UNE regulation.
If UNE-P rates are at or above the competitive level, they still entail an op-
portunity cost in terms of consumer surplus. Instead of transferring wealth to
consumers via competitors, policymakers could have achieved the transfer by
reducing access charges, USF assessments, or other measures that generate
revenues for cross-subsidies. The price reductions associated with such poli-
cies would increase consumption of the affected services, and consumer sur-
157 Thomas W. Hazlett, The Irony of Regulated Competition in Telecommunications, 4
COLUM. Sci. & TECH L. REv. 10-13 (2003).
158 See id.
159 See LARRY F. DARBY ET AL., PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., THE CLEC EXPERIMENT:
ANATOMY OF A MELTDOWN 2 (2002), http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/pops/pop9.23clecexperiment.pdf.
160 First Order, supra note 16, 231-34.
161 See, e.g., In re Access Charge Reform; Price Cap Performance Review for Local
Exchange Carriers; Transport Rate Structure and Pricing Usage of the Public Switched Net-
work by Information Service and Internet Access Providers, 11 F.C.C.R. 21,354, 42
(1996) ("Current access charges distort competition .... ").
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plus would increase as a result. This increase in consumer surplus that policy-
makers forego by regulating the price of UNEs instead of reducing excessive
charges on other services is an opportunity cost of UNE regulation.
C. Total Effect on Consumer Welfare
Using data from the state studies and Table 4, it is possible to estimate the
total opportunity cost of UNE-P regulation. Table 5 presents estimates based
on a comparison to long-distance access charges and USF assessment reduc-
tions. The Table takes the size of the wealth transfer from ILECs to CLECs
and consumers by UNE regulation as the starting point. It then calculates how
that wealth transfer would affect consumer surplus and total consumer welfare
if it were achieved through a reduction in access charges and USF assessments
imposed on long-distance service. The total consumer welfare gain from this
alternative policy is then subtracted from the total consumer welfare gain at-
tributed to UNE-P regulation to calculate the net benefit or cost of UNE-P
regulation.
The calculations underlying Table 5 translate the total wealth transfer into a
percentage reduction in the per-minute long-distance rates and then use a de-
mand elasticity of -0.7 to calculate the change in consumer surplus. The total
consumer welfare gain is the opportunity cost to consumers of transferring
wealth through UNE-P regulation. Subtracting this amount from the total con-
sumer welfare gain in Table 3 shows the net effect on consumer welfare of
UNE-P regulation. In all cases except the California "aggressive" scenario,
UNE-P regulation generates a substantial consumer welfare loss compared to
reducing inflated long-distance prices. As Figure 3 shows, regulators could
create more consumer benefits by reducing access charges or USF assessments
than by transferring an equivalent amount of wealth to CLECs.
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Figure 3: Consumer Benefits of Platform Regulation Versus Access Charge












Illinois, SBC, 2002 Michigan, SB 2002 California, SBC, California, SC, New Jersey, Verizon, New Jersey, Verizon,
2003 2003 ("aggressive") 2003 2003 ("aggressive")
("conservative") ("conservative")
[M Platform regulation EAccess charge reduction
Table 5: Reduced Long-Distance Access Charges or Assessments as an
Opportunity Cost of UNE-P Regulation
Illinois, SBC, 2002 $191,298,913 $39,311,671 $230,610,584 -$23,794,498 -$6.81
Michigan, SBC, 2002 $105,839,624 $17,885,245 $123,724,870 -$54,140,413 -$19.44
California, SBC, 2003 $211,081,850 $6,551,343 $217,633,192 -$81,379,834 -$7.11
("conservative")
California, SBC, 2003 $414,185,185 $25,224,216 $439,409,401 -$1,061,637 -$0.09
("aggressive")
New Jersey, Verizon, $68,091,066 $887,012 $68,978,078 -$61,685,875 -$13.29
2003 ("conservative")




D. The National Opportunity Cost
The foregoing analysis examined the benefits and opportunity costs of UNE-
P regulation for residential consumers in the service territories of large ILECs
in several states. Sufficient data exists to estimate very crudely the nationwide
opportunity cost associated with the wealth transferred to UNE-P-based
CLECs. The National Regulatory Research Institute's surveys of UNE prices,
AT&T's 2002 estimate of ILECs' avoided costs, and various FCC reports pro-
vide the data.
62
Table 6 presents the results. The first two columns estimate the amount of
wealth transferred from ILECs to CLECs by UNE-P regulation. Unlike the
state-based tables above, the calculations include all UNE-P based lines, not
just those sold to residential customers. They assume that the amount of reve-
nue at stake when the ILEC loses a line to a CLEC is equal to average local
revenues per line, which includes revenues from local services sold by the
ILEC but not long-distance service. These figures underestimate the amount of
the transfer, for two reasons. First, the figures omit the wealth transfers that
occur in a number of smaller states for which the FCC does not report CLEC
line counts. Second, the figures measure only the wealth transfer from ILECs
to CLECs; they do not include any wealth transferred from ILECs to consum-
ers when competition from UNE-P based CLECs forces ILECs to reduce their
own prices. A comparison of the wealth transfer figures in Tables 3 and 4 sug-
gests that the total wealth transfer can be more than three times as large as the
transfer to CLECs when the ILECs' price reductions are included in the total.
Nevertheless, the wealth transfers in Table 6 are substantial: $1.3 billion in
2002, and $3.1 billion in 2003. The wealth transfer more than doubled in one
year due to a decline in regulated UNE-P prices, a 30% increase in UNE-P
based lines, and an increase in ILEC revenues per line.
162 Tables 6 and 7 are the authors' calculations based on three data sources. See AT&T
Ex Parte Communication, supra note 153; Gregg, supra note 100; LOCAL TELEPHONE COM-
PETITION: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2003, supra note 133; NAT'L REGULATORY RE-
SEARCH INST., STATE REGULATORY TREATMENT OF ADVANCED TELECOMMUNICATIONS SER-
VICES: RESULTS OF THE 2002 SURVEY (2002), http://www.nrri.ohio-
state.edu/cartl/download.php?id=02- 12.
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Table 6: Nationwide Opportunity Costs to Consumers of UNE-P Regulation6 3
2002 $1,326,138,446 $138.42 $26,340,716 $1,352,479,162 $141.17
2003 $3,145,820,811 $228.35 $148,223,754 $3,294,044,564 $239.11
If used to reduce interstate long-distance access charges or USF assess-
ments, these wealth transfers would have cut the price of long-distance service
by 4/10 of a cent in 2002 and 9/10 of a cent in 2003. These price reductions
would have generated gains in consumer surplus as consumers used more long-
distance service. The total consumer welfare gain is the sum of the wealth
transfer and the consumer surplus gain. These figures suggest that the opportu-
nity cost of UNE-P regulation was about $3.3 billion in 2003. Stated differ-
ently, UNE-P regulation did not provide a net benefit to consumers unless it
increased consumer welfare by more than $3.3 billion or about $240 for each
line furnished by CLECs using the platform.
These figures measure one opportunity cost of UNE-P regulation to con-
sumers. However, they do not measure the entire opportunity cost to society as
a whole. If long-distance access charges or USF fees were reduced, telecom-
munications companies that sell these services would also benefit from in-
creased sales. The companies benefit from sales to the extent that the increased
revenues exceed the additional costs. Conversely, the welfare of both compa-
nies and consumers falls when excessive charges increase long-distance rates.
The change in consumer plus producer welfare that occurs as a result of these
charges is the "excess burden" of raising the revenue that the charges produce.
In a series of papers, Hausman has estimated the average excess burden associ-
ated with taxes and USF assessments on long-distance and wireless service.'64
Each dollar raised through an assessment on long-distance has an average ex-
cess burden of at least sixty-five cents, and each dollar raised through an as-
sessment on wireless service has an average excess burden of fifty-three cents.
These results make it possible to estimate a more complete measure of the op-
portunity cost of UNE-P regulation that includes the entire change in excess
163 Id.
164 Jerry Hausman, Efficiency Effects on the U.S. Economy from Wireless Taxation, 53
NAT'L TAX J. 733 (2000); Jerry Hausman, Taxation by Telecommunications Regulation, 12
TAX POL'Y & THE ECON. 29-48 (James M. Poterba ed., 1998).
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burden, rather than just the change in consumer welfare.
Table 7 shows the combined opportunity costs to producers and consumers
of transferring wealth via UNE regulation rather than a reduction in USF as-
sessments on wireless and long-distance. The calculations assume that assess-
ments against long-distance and wireless would each have been reduced by the
same percentage. Comparing Tables 6 and 7, the social opportunity cost is
40% greater than the opportunity cost to consumers in 2002 and 50% larger in
2003.
Table 7: Nationwide Social Opportunity Costs of UNE-P Regulation
2002 $1,326,138,446 $138.42 $825,388,569 $2,151,527,015 $224.58
2003 $3,145,820,811 $228.35 $1,920,209,023 $5,066,029,833 $367.74
E. Nationwide Benefits of UNE-P Regulation
Our data does not permit us to calculate the analogous nationwide benefits
of UNE-P regulation, due to a lack of quality data on CLECs' prices and con-
sumer savings in each state. In a forthcoming book, however, Crandall exam-
ines the effects of the Act's unbundling provisions more generally. 6 Using
rather generous assumptions, he estimates that in 2003 unbundling may have
transferred approximately $1.3 billion from ILEC phone companies to residen-
tial and small business consumers.
1 66
The UNE-P accounts for a large majority of CLEC lines furnished using
UNEs-71% in 2002 and 78% in 2003.167 If we assume that the entire $1.3
billion in savings is due to UNE-P regulation, then our figures in Table 6 imply
that consumers received about 42% of the wealth transferred from ILECs.1
6
1 If
165 ROBERT W. CRANDALL, COMPETITION AND CHAOS: THE U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SECTOR SINCE 1996 (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 54-56, on file with authors).
166 Id.
167 LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2003, supra note 133,
tbl.4.
168 This figure was calculated by dividing $1.3 billion in consumer savings from UNE-P
regulation by the $3.1 billion transferred from incumbent phone companies. Mathemati-
cally, this equals 0.42.
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the wealth transfer had been used to reduce access charges and USF contribu-
tions from long-distance, consumer welfare would have increased by about
$3.3 billion. Consequently, UNE-P regulation produced about 39% of the con-
sumer benefits that an equivalent reduction in long-distance access charges and
USF contributions would have produced.6 9
These ratios are consistent with the findings reported in Tables 4 and 5 for
individual states. Consumers would have received much larger benefits if regu-
lators had focused on reducing the market distorting effects caused by long-
distance access charges and USF contributions, instead of mandating the UNE-
P.
Competition often offers non-price benefits, such as innovative new ser-
vices, but such benefits are unlikely to occur under UNE-P regulation. Since
competitors leasing the platform do not build their own local facilities, plat-
form regulation permits them no opportunity to offer local services different
from those offered by the incumbents. In theory, UNE-P regulation might
eventually open the door to innovative new services if CLECs use the UNE-P
as a transitional strategy to enter the market before building their own facili-
ties. In practice, empirical research shows that UNE-P regulation has precisely
the opposite effect because it served as a substitute for facilities-based compe-
tition.
V. CONCLUSION
In rejecting the UNE-P, regulators have rejected a policy that entailed sig-
nificant opportunity costs for consumers. Subsequently, the telecommunica-
tions debate has moved on. Going forward, the regulatory priorities appear to
include: expanding the amount of spectrum available for wireless service;7 '
reforming the intercarrier compensation arrangements that subsidize local
phone service and tax other services; 7' keeping Voice over Internet Protocol
169 This figure was calculated by dividing $1.3 billion in consumer savings from UNE-P
regulation by the $3.3 billion increase in consumer welfare from reducing long-distance
access charges and USF contributions. Mathematically, this equals 0.39.
170 See Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC to Commence Spec-
trum Auction that will Provide American Consumers New Wireless Broadband Services
(December 29, 2004), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
255802A I.pdf. The auction cannot occur until June 2006 because the Commercial Spectrum
Enhancement Act of 2004 requires the FCC to notify the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration at least eighteen months prior to the auction of any frequencies
mentioned in the legislation, so that any public sector users can be relocated to other spec-
trum. Id.
171 See In re Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F.C.C.R. 4685 (Feb. 10, 2005).
20051
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
services (a substitute for both local and long-distance telephony) free from
public utility regulation;.72 and (perhaps) access charges and USF contribu-
tions. " 3 These initiatives would all help reduce the price distortions in long-
distance and wireless service markets. Thus, there is room for cautious opti-
mism that the FCC has embarked on a regulatory reform agenda consistent
with the findings in this article.
172 See In re Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Rulemaking Con-
cerning an Order from the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 22,404 (Nov. 9, 2004).
'73 See Wireline Competition Bureau Extends Reply Comment Deadlines for IP-Enabled
Services Rulemaking and SBC's "IP Platform Services" Forbearance Petition, Public No-
tice, 19 F.C.C.R. 10,474 (June 9, 2004).
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